Dong Binyu.On Kant’s View of Conscience[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2024,64(04):144-154. DOI: 10.13471/j.cnki.jsysusse.2024.04.015.
In Kantian ethics, the conscience is always a controversial concept. Is the conscience rational or affective? Does the conscience belong to intelligent deliberation or intuitive response? Generally there are two opposite interpretations: rationalism and sentimentalism. This paper puts forward a point reconciling them: the conscience in Kantian ethics should be a moral intuition fusing reason and feeling. The conscience is the product of judgment, at the same time it belongs to a general practical reason, but radically it is still a moral feeling including reason and feeling. As a moral intuition, the conscience is best grasped from a point of naturalism. In practical operation, the conscience has the advantage of rapidness and acuteness, but will lead to vagueness and divergence for various reason.